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In Administrative Substance, Cass Sunstein invites us to study care-
fully the pathologies of regulation, and then to apply the lessons derived
from this study to the more difficult task of improving the substance of
regulatory programs.' Professor Sunstein is especially critical of "social"
regulation that requires agencies to identify the best available technolo-
gies and to write standards that require individual regulatees to use those
technologies. 2 In particular, Sunstein rejects this strategy's presumption
that all similarly situated regulatees are capable of meeting the standards
of the best performers in the industry. 3 Yet when we look at the same
evidence that was marshalled by Sunstein, we draw a remarkably differ-
ent conclusion: Congress's decision to order the reduction of toxic sub-
stances to the lowest point permitted by the "best available technology"
(BAT) is rational, and stands up well when compared to the reliance on
market-related regulation preferred by Sunstein. 4 Although we agree
with Sunstein that the technology-based approach to social regulation is
far from perfect, we will attempt to show how Sunstein undervalues tech-
nology-based health and safety legislation and overvalues the alternative
market-related regulation. In the final analysis, some combination of ap-
proaches may prove most desirable in most regulatory contexts.
Our critique proceeds in three parts. First, in Part II, we contest
Sunstein's calculations of "costs" and "benefits," and his conclusion that
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1. See Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607.
2. See id. at 627-31.
3. See id. at 628.
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stringent regulation causes underregulation. Second, in Part III, we ar-
gue that even when the employment of a technology-based regulation
gives rise to costs that exceed benefits (as conventionally measured by
economists) that regulation may be justified on normative grounds. Fi-
nally, in Part IV, we show that practical reasons can also justify regula-
tory programs that an economist would deem "inefficient." In
particular, we suggest that although market-related regulation could play
an important role in, for example, the control of toxic substances, this
approach is not so demonstrably effective so as to warrant the abandon-
ment of the technology-based approach.
II. OVERREGULATION AND UNDERREGULATION
Sunstein will have no part of the broad conservative critique that
most government regulation is paternalistic, or at least makes matters
worse, but he hastens to add that regulation has had its fair share of
failures.5 This latter point, of course, is not a new one. In fact, Professor
Breyer forcefully presented the problems of regulatory failure more than
a decade ago in his important project for the American Bar Association
Commission on Law and the Economy.6 Professor Sunstein's contribu-
tion to the substantive regulation debate lies in his observation that pro-
grams that have performed poorly have done so along identifiable lines
because of "regulatory paradoxes. ' ' 7 One of these so-called regulatory
paradoxes is the idea that strict regulation of toxic substances will actu-
ally result in less protection than more lenient regulation. 8 First ex-
pressed by Professor John Mendeloff in a recent critique of Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation under the banner
"overregulation causes underregulation," 9 this idea has an attractive ring
to those, including Sunstein, who have little sympathy for "command-
and-control" regulatory programs.10 However, in this discussion, we dis-
pute Mendeloff's (and presumably Sunstein's) conclusions that OSHA
has engaged in overregulation and that the adoption of less stringent
standards will increase OSHA's regulatory productivity. We begin first,
5. See id. at 625-27.
6. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL
REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM (Exposure Draft 1978). In this paper appeared partial or skele-
tal versions of the framework presented in S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
7. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 629-30.
8. See id. at 629.
9. J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES REGULATION: How OVERREGU-
LATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 3 (1988). By "overregulation," Mendeloff means
any regulation whose costs exceed its benefits, as economists conventionally measure those conse-
quences. Id. at 24.
10. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 627.
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however, by questioning Sunstein's foundation that costs and benefits can
be (and have been) adequately computed.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Strict Regulation
Sunstein cites with approval Mendeloff's finding that only one of ten
health standards promulgated by OSHA-the asbestos standard-has a
reasonable cost ($400,000 per life saved), whereas the other nine stan-
dards each cost millions of dollars and save only a few lives." Sunstein
particularly emphasizes the vinyl chloride standard.12 That standard, ac-
cording to Mendeloff, saves only one life per year at a cost of $40 mil-
lion. t3 However, Mendeloff's calculations of the costs and benefits of
toxic substance regulation are subject to numerous sources of error, none
of which appears to cause Sunstein any pause.
On the cost side, Mendeloff's principal problem is his reliance on
cost estimates that are based, for the most part, on notoriously inaccurate
before-the-fact predictions.14 Although Mendeloff recognizes the uncer-
tainty that this problem introduces into his analysis, 15 neither he nor
Sunstein hesitate to make policy recommendations based on the assump-
tion that these ex ante cost estimates proved accurate. Attempts to vali-
date cost projections in light of subsequent experience have been sparse,
but the evidence that does exist suggests that pre-implementation cost
estimates are often far too high.1 6
The inadequacies of Mendeloff's cost estimates pale in comparison
with his failure to grapple with the exceedingly complex and value-laden
issues inherent in estimating or measuring health and environmental reg-
ulation's benefits. To begin with, current techniques for risk assessment
simply do not have the power to permit anything approximating precise
11. See id. at 625 & n.80; see also J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 22.
12. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 625 n.80.
13. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 22.
14. For example, a former Department of Labor economist noted that the actual cost of com-
plying with OSHA's vinyl chloride standard was only about seven percent of the predicted cost. See
M. CONNERTON & M. MACCARTHY, CoST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS AND REGULATION: EXPRESSWAY
TO REFORM OR BLIND ALLEY? 20 (1982) (citing study conducted by Industrial Research Unit of the
Wharton School, published in H. NORTHRUP, R. ROWAN & C. PERRY, THE IMPACT OF OSHA
(1978)).
15. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 55-59.
16. See M. GREEN & N. WAITZMAN, BUSINESS WAR ON THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
BENEFrrS OF FEDERAL HEALTH/SAFETY ENFORCEMENT 54-55 (1979); M. CONNERTON & M.
MACCARTHY, supra note 14, at 20 (citing PUTNAM, HAYES & BARTLETT, INC., COMPARISONS OF
ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL POLLUTION CONTROL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES FOR SELECTED INDUS-
TRIES (June 1980) (prepared for Office of Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency)).
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calculations of the number of lives saved by a health or safety standard. 17
For example, the predictions of cancer risk assessment models can vary
over ten orders of magnitude.18 Translated into economic terms, the dif-
ference between some low and high estimates of cancer risk approximates
the difference between the price of a cup of coffee and the national debt. 19
The vinyl chloride standard, cited by Mendeloff as the worst exam-
ple of overregulation, 20 exemplifies the imprecision in risk measurement
particularly well. In calculating that the vinyl chloride standard saves
only one life per year, Mendeloff makes several assumptions that belittle
the impact of the standard. In fact, given the uncertainties in the infor-
mation and the primitive state of current knowledge about environmen-
tal carcinogenesis, an estimate of twenty or even forty lives per year
saved by the vinyl chloride standard would be equally plausible.21 Under
17. Epidemiological studies of groups of humans who have historically received greater than
normal exposures to chemicals can provide some direct evidence of risk, but these studies are notori-
ously inconclusive. See Cranor, Epidemiology and Procedural Protections for Workplace Health in
The Aftermath of the Benzene Case, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 372, 382-96 (1983) (practical and theoretical
difficulties with epidemiological studies of human beings create problems of accuracy and reliability);
Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncer-
tainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 361-64 (1982) (deficiencies in epidemiological data on benzene could
not be remedied, and hence were characterized as "knowledge uncertainty"); McGarity, Substantive
and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Car-
cinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 740 (1979) (epidemiological studies are subject to
varying interpretations). Moreover, the validity of virtually any animal study can be significantly
challenged by such questions as the appropriateness of extrapolating from high-dose animal expo-
sures to low-dose human exposures, the choice of the particular species, the validity of test designs,
and the applicability of exposure routes. See R. MERRILL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CANCER-
CAUSING CHEMICALS 58-71 (1982) (report for ACUS); Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP), Chemical Carcinogens; A Review of the Science and its Associated Principles, February,
1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,372, 10,420-21 (1985). In addition, few studies can satisfactorily surmount
the problems inherent in calculating the number of persons exposed to any chemical. This informa-
tion is expensive to obtain, and OSHA must heavily rely upon employers for this critical piece of the
puzzle. See McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health
and Environmental Regulation, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 1 59, 183-85 [hereinaf-
ter McGarity, Media-Quality]; Merrill, supra, at 74-82; OSTP, supra, at 10,424.
18. See Cranor, supra note 17, at 381; Latin, supra note 17, at 370-71; Comment, The Signifi-
cant Risk Requirement in OSHA Regulation of Carcinogens: Industrial Union Department, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 33 STAN. L. REV. 551, 565 (1981).
19. See Cothern, Coniglio & Marcus, Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH. 111, 115 (1986).
20. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 248.
21. To support his estimate, Mendeloff cites a study that relied on an early epidemiological
study of workers exposed to vinyl chloride. This study estimated that only two deaths would be
prevented each year by the current vinyl chloride standard. J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 66.
However, the study depends on the astounding assumption that the 21 angiosarcoma deaths defini-
tively attributed to vinyl chloride exposure through 1976 constituted all of the deaths caused by
vinyl chloride during the preceding forty years. Mendeloff also interprets an Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) risk assessment based upon animal bioassays to conclude that only two cancers
per year would be prevented by the standard. But to reach this result, he reduced EPA's predictions
by a factor of eight to take into account the fact that workers are only exposed for eight hours per
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this alternative calculation, the vinyl chloride standard costs only $1 to
$2 million per life saved, which is well within the cost range that most
persons, including Mendeloff,22 would consider reasonable. 23
In addition, Mendeloff fails to factor many benefits of health and
safety regulation, other than the saving of lives, into his cost-benefit
calculus. For example, Mendeloff does not attempt to measure the value
of reducing the number of non-fatal illnesses, the lost productivity attrib-
utable to occupational disease, or the welfare and social security pay-
ments made to workers who become ill.24 Mendeloff also fails to
consider adequately other "soft variables" benefits, such as the emotional
loss to the injured workers' loved ones. Mendeloff argues that the "will-
ingness to pay" measurement of benefits includes these benefits because
workers factor the potential cost of the consequences of occupational ill-
ness into the payment they demand. 25 No empirical evidence yet sup-
ports this claim. Moreover, the suggestion that people accurately
consider the possible future loss of productivity when they engage in
risky conduct, let alone the loss of grieving relatives, seems on its face
highly implausible.26
The vagaries inherent in calculating the benefits of a health or safety
standard extend beyond the uncertainties in estimating the number of
lives saved, the number of illnesses prevented, and the amount of pain
day for 45 years. Id. at 288 n.21. Yet given that the EPA risk assessment could easily be off by a
factor of ten, that estimate might just as easily be 20 or even 40 cancers per year.
22. In his benefit calculations, Mendeloff values each life at $2.5 million. J. MENDELOFF, supra
note 9, at 52.
23. Sunstein or Mendeloff might respond that the imprecision in risk assessments does not
justify choosing the upper confidence level to calculate the benefits of a standard. However, estimat-
ing higher risk levels than those indicated by the use of the lowest confidence level is valid if the
purpose of the regulatory scheme is to increase the protection of workers from toxic substances,
rather than to minimize worker protection. On a narrower ground, Mendeloff can sustain his argu-
ment that the vinyl chloride standard is an egregious example of overregulation only by using the
lowest estimate of risk to calculate the benefits of the standard. Because it is equally plausible that
the number of lives saved is greater than Mendeloff's estimates, we are reluctant to base public
policy on calculations that are so imprecise.
24. Savings associated with reducing welfare and social security payments may be considerable.
In fiscal year 1989, social security payments to disabled workers (for injuries and illnesses) totaled
$7.65 billion. NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INSTITUTE, SAFER WORK: JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH
CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 7 (1988).
25. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 27.
26. In effect, Mendeloff simply ignores these important consequences of occupational illness,
rather than attempting to measure them or place a dollar value on them. This blindered view is
typical of the economist's tendency to "dwarf soft variables" that do not lend themselves to precise
quantitative analysis. See Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Envi-
ronmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1318-19 (1974) (being under constant pressure to reduce the
dimensions of a problem to "hard" data so as to make "objective" comparison possible, some policy
analysts are induced to "overlook or understress a variety of values that might, in context, be charac-
terized as 'fragile' ").
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avoided. The dollar-for-dollar comparisons that both Mendeloff and
Sunstein advocate require that the numerical estimates of risk be multi-
plied by the dollar value of avoiding each of those unattractive out-
comes. 27 Thus, Mendeloff calculates the value of a human life as $2.5
million, relying on a "willingness to pay" measurement defined by the
wage that premium workers receive for working in dangerous condi-
tions. 28 However, most wage premium studies (and all of those used by
Mendeloff) are based on safety hazards, not health risks.29
The little empirical evidence available on wage premiums for occu-
pational illness is suspect for three reasons. First, most studies pre-date
the implementation of OSHA's hazard communication standard.30 Even
with the hazard communication standard, many workers are still not ap-
prized of all of the health risks to which they are exposed. 31 Second,
even assuming the availability of full information, most workers would
be unable to wade through the extraordinarily complex risk data to form
rational conclusions about the extent of risks in the workplace. 32 Even if
workers could understand the data, they would likely undervalue low-
probability/high consequence risks based on the familiar "it-can't-hap-
pen-to-me" theory.33 In this case, "risk premium" measures of small
risks to life would generally be too low. 34 Finally, wage premium studies
assume that workers make free and unconstrained choices. Unfortu-
nately, low-paid workers in hazardous industries where there are no (or
weak) unions may act more out of desperation than choice.35
27. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 27.
28. Id. at 29.
29. See id at 44-45. Mendeloff hypothesizes that workers would pay less for reductions in
health risks than safety risks because illnesses, as compared to accidents, occur later in life. But even
Mendeloff concedes that workers might pay more to reduce health risks because cancer is a painful
and dreaded disease. Id at 48.
30. For example, only five of the eighteen wage-premium studies cited by Mendeloff, see J.
MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 28, post-date OSHA's original hazard communication standard,
which was promulgated in 1983. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983).
31. See Settle & Weisbrod, Governmentally-Imposed Standards" Some Normative Aspects, Insti-
tute for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 439-77, at 27-28 (University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 1977).
32. See id.
33. See id. at 28, 31.
34. See P. ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION: PUTTING A PRICE ON LIFE AND LIMB
70-77 (1988).
35. See A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 21 (1975); Kelman, Cost.
Benefit Analysis and Environmental, Safety, and Health Regulation: Ethical and Philosophical Con-
siderations, in CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS,
AND METHODS 137, 144 (D. Swartzman, R. Liroff& K. Croke eds. 1982). Walking away from ajob
is a difficult choice in an era of chronically high unemployment. The dissatisfied worker who quits
often loses personal and family pension benefits and health insurance in addition to losing his or her
stream of income. The worker may also have to undergo retraining and incur other transaction
734 [Vol. 1991:729
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In addition, basing calculations of benefits on supposed wage premi-
ums entails two controversial value judgments. First, most econoinists
(although not Mendeloff) believe in discounting future health benefits to
present value. Yet in cases of toxic substance exposure, where the onset
of disease can be delayed by as much as thirty years, this practice effec-
tively ignores the risk altogether. 36
Second, most of those who advocate application of health, safety,
and environmental regulation to a quantitative cost-benefit litmus test
apparently prefer a "willingness to pay" measure of the benefits of a
health or environmental regulation to a "willingness to sell" approach.37
Unlike many economists, Sunstein understands the "offer-asking" prob-
lem and recognizes the "willingness to sell" approach as the better mea-
sure, because it is not limited by the wealth of the beneficiaries of
regulation. 38 Yet Sunstein fails to acknowledge the implications that this
critical choice has on Mendeloff's conclusions. Sunstein accepts the con-
ventional economic wisdom that health and environmental regulations
have "imposed enormously high costs for speculative benefits. ' 39 By
this, he presumably means that the costs of these standards are so high
that no conceivable "willingness to buy" valuation would justify them.
However, Sunstein avoids the much harder question of whether the more
equitable "willingness to sell" measure might actually justify health and
environmental regulation. Instead, he merely assumes that Mendeloff's
questionable methods of calculation are the proper measure of these reg-
ulations' costs and benefits.
Given the vast technical uncertainties and anchorless moral judg-
ments reflected in the cost-benefit calculations for health and safety stan-
dards, basing important public policy decisions on these quantitative
costs. See Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses To Occupational Disease" The Role of Markets, Regula-
tion, and Information, 72 GEo. L.J. 1231, 1241 (1984).
36. See Russell, "Discounting Human Life" (Or, the Anatomy of a Moral-Economic Issue), RE-
SOURCES, Winter 1986, at 8. However, economists are untroubled by the practice, arguing without
empirical evidence that people probably place a lower value on reducing risks that materialize in the
future. See, eg., J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 49.
37. See, e-g., M. GREEN & N. WArrZMAN, supra note 16, at 43-48.
38. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 634. There is no reason to believe that a poor person would
sell the right to be safe for any less than a rich person would. There is every reason to believe,
however, that a person's wealth will affect how much he or she can pay to purchase the right to be
safe. Indeed, economic research cited by Mendeloff indicates as much. A study by Marin and
Psacharopoulos using the willingness to pay criteria found that the best estimate of the value of life
was $2.5 million for manual workers and $9.0 million for non-manual workers. J. MENDELOFF,
supra note 9, at 28, Table 2.3 (citing Marin & Psacharopoulos, The Reward for Risk in the Labor
Market: Evidence from the United Kingdom and a Reconciliation with Other Studies, 90 J. POL.
ECON. 827 (1982)). Presumably, the estimate for a class limited to company presidents and board
chairpersons would be even higher.
39. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 625.
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cost-benefit comparisons is patently unreasonable. Although Sunstein
avows that he is doing nothing of the kind, and specifically cautions that
cost-benefit analysis is only an effort "to compare the advantages and
disadvantages of regulatory strategy," 4° his policy conclusions display lit-
tle of this laudable restraint. Relying uncritically on Mendeloff's poorly
supported conclusion that OSHA's existing health standards result in
overregulation, Sunstein is fully prepared to abandon technology-based
regulation and to advocate that courts should presume that Congress
wants agencies to balance costs and benefits when they promulgate
regulations. 41
B. The Consequences of Strict Regulation
Even assuming that OSHA has engaged in "overregulation," as
Mendeloff defines the term, it does not necessarily follow that underregu-
lation has resulted. Sunstein argues, relying again on Professor
Mendeloff, that overregulation leads to underregulation because the
"threat of draconian regulatory requirements gives industries powerful
incentives to fight regulation wherever they can, and gives agencies a
powerful incentive not to promulgate or enforce them."' 42 OSHA's ac-
tual experience in setting standards, however, demonstrates the naive be-
lief that less stringent standards will reduce industry opposition.
For example, the standard that Sunstein identifies as the most "rea-
sonable" of all OSHA's early standards-the asbestos standard-was
fiercely challenged by industry,43 even though the adverse effects of as-
bestos on workers were incontrovertible.44 In addition, the industry
fought OSHA's attempts to amend the 1972 asbestos standard for over a
decade, even though Mendeloff himself concedes that cost-benefit calcu-
lations warrant even further reductions in asbestos exposure.45 The sug-
40. Id. at 626 n.83.
41. See id. at 626-27.
42. Id. at 630.
43. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,479 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (industry repre-
sentatives testified that they could not foreseeably reduce asbestos dust concentrations to the two-
fiber standard promulgated by OSHA).
44. See id. at 471 & n.7; Mintz, Occupational Safety and Health: The Federal Regulatory Pro-
gram-A History, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE 691, 695-96 (B. Plog ed. 1988)
(description of asbestos standard challenge).
45. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 22, 52. The industry reduced its opposition to the
OSHA asbestos standard only when the EPA decided to ban the substance under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1988). See Asbestos Manufacturing, Import, Processing
Banned, Phased out under Final EPA Regualations, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 534 (July 14, 1989) (re-
porting EPA Administrator William Reilly's press conference announcement of the ban). At that
point, industry pressured the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to force the EPA to refer the
standard to OSHA. See SUBCOMM. ON Toxic SUBSTANCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL OVERSIGHT OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., OFFICE
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gestion that industry will be persuaded not to challenge a standard that
imposes substantial costs on its members merely by the fact that the ben-
efits to someone else will be even larger than the costs to the industry is
clearly fanciful.
Moreover, the fate of OSHA's new air contaminants standard46 pro-
vides an even clearer contradiction of the Sunstein-Mendeloff thesis that
strict regulation spurs industry opposition and agency inaction. In the
new regulation, OSHA adopted less stringent standards for air contami-
nants by relying almost exclusively on threshold limit values (TLVs) es-
tablished by the American Conference of Governmental and Industrial
Hygienists (ACGIH), rather than promulgating feasibility-based stan-
dards for each of the more than 400 substances for which permissible
exposure limits (PELs) already existed.4 7 This approach cannot be char-
acterized as unduly stringent, even by Mendeloff's own cost-benefit test;
he predicts that these moves to relax regulatory requirements will over-
come the overregulation/underregulation problem.4 8
However, the new standard was challenged by twenty-eight different
companies and trade associations. 49 OSHA attempted to settle the cases
by compromising with the challengers. Most of the proposed conces-
sions were made by OSHA and involved reductions in the stringency of
the new PELs. Despite OSHA's willingness to make significant conces-
sions to avoid litigation, eleven challengers insisted on going to court.5 0
The fact that so many companies and trade associations were willing
to undergo the substantial expense of a judicial challenge is understanda-
ble, given the economics of the situation. OSHA estimated that the aver-
age annual cost of complying with each of the 376 PELs in the air
contaminants standard was about $2 million.5 1 Because judicial review
"delay[s] the implementation of OSHA standards by an average of two
years,"' 52 a company or trade association could save its industry $320,000
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET INFLUENCE ON AGENCY REGULATIONS (Comm. Print 1986).
Even then, the industry did not stop resisting a stringent standard. The amended standard that
OSHA finally promulgated was remanded by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, because OSHA failed to adequately address union objections. See Industrial Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
46. Amendment of Air Contaminants Standard, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 (1989) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1000).
47. Id. at 2724-25.
48. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 85-87.
49. See Challenges to Air Contaminants Standard Filed in Circuit Courts, Empl. Safety &
Health Guide (CCH) No. 935, at 1 (Apr. 11, 1989).
50. Telephone interview with Charles Gordon, Office of the Solicitor, Department of Labor
(May 22, 1990).
51. 54 Fed. Reg. at 2851-53.
52. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 35, at 1257-58.
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by filing an appeal, assuming an eight percent annual interest rate.
Therefore, even if the trade association discounted the prospects of vic-
tory, it could justify an appeal to its members as long as the appeal cost
less than $320,000. If the association's lawyers spent 500 hours on the
appeal (which seems more than sufficient to appeal even a complicated
standard), the association could afford legal fees of up to $640 an hour
and still save its members money compared to the costs of immediate
compliance with the OSHA standard. Investment in an appeal becomes
more attractive when the trade association can purchase legal services at
less than $640 an hour (a likely possibility), when the industry can place
the money saved into investments that yield a higher return than eight
percent, or when the standard is likely to cost the industry more than $2
million.
Although most affected industries did not challenge the air contami-
nants standard, the reason is simple: in eighty percent of the cases, the
standard merely adopted the status quo.5 3 Concededly, the standard
does provide additional protection to approximately four and one-half
million workers,5 4 but the level of protection is very limited. A recent
study found that "[t]he Air Contaminants standard is more conservative
than the ACGIH in the treatment of occupational carcinogens."55 The
ACGIH generally will not characterize a substance as a carcinogen un-
less there is epidemiological data indicating that it has caused cancer in
humans. 56 Health-oriented federal agencies, with the exception of
OSHA in promulgating this air contaminants standard, abandoned this
conservative strategy decades ago as a "body-counting" approach to
standard setting. Moreover, the ACGIH ignores published scientific ma-
terial and relies more heavily on industry-supplied data than OSHA gen-
erally does in its promulgation of health standards.57
53. 54 Fed. Reg. at 2727 (OSHA survey indicated that only 131,005 firms of 500,000 included
in survey would incur costs to comply with new standard).
54. Id. at 2725.
55. Paxman & Robinson, Regulation of Occupational Carcinogens under OSHA 's Air Contami.
nants Standard, 12 REGULATORY ToxicoLoGY & PHARMACOLOGY 296, 302 (1990).
56. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 292 n.26.
57. See Castleman & Ziem, Corporate Influence On Threshold Limit Values, 13 AM. J. INDUS.
MED. 531, 537 (1988) (many TLVs approved by ACGIH committees based on little or nothing more
than unpublished corporate communications and studies); Roach & Rappaport, But They Are Not
Thresholds: A Critical Analysis of The Documentation of Threshold Limit Values, 17 AM. J. INDUS.
MED. 727, 733 (1990) (marked discordance between TLV and scientific evidence considered by AC-
GIH). OSHA defends its reliance on TLVs on the ground that they often constitute the only reliable
basis for a generic standard, see Amendment of Air Contaminants Standard, 54 Fed. Reg. 2727
(1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000), but this argument has been forcefully rebutted. See
Robinson, Paxman & Rappaport, Implications of OSHA's Reliance on TLVs in Developing the Air
Contaminants Standard, 19 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 3, 10-12 (1991) (arguing that the TLV process is
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. This experience suggests that industry will generally resist any new
OSHA regulation as long as companies find it economically beneficial to
invest resources in litigation over investments in safety. How cost-benefi-
cial OSHA's standards appear to disinterested economists is irrelevant to
the industry.
Ultimately, the argument that "overregulation causes underregula-
tion" fails because of its one-sided view of the problem of industry oppo-
sition. We therefore urge that instead of concentrating on overregulation
(as do Sunstein and Mendelofi) and in effect yielding to industry extor-
tion, Congress should focus on the underregulation side-by making it
easier for OSHA to regulate. This could be done by reducing the burden
of proof that OSHA must present to defend strict standards.58
Although Sunstein, unlike Mendeloff, is willing to acknowledge that
cost-benefit analysis is not always the most appropriate basis for regula-
tion, neither Sunstein nor Mendeloff can adequately explain why we
should not solve the problem of underregulation by reducing the govern-
ment's burden of proof, rather than by reducing the level of protection
afforded to the intended beneficiaries.
III. THE NORMATIVE BASIS FOR TECHNOLOGY-BASED
REGULATION
The choice of any regulatory approach can be debated on normative
and instrumental grounds. In this section, we argue that normative con-
siderations make technology-based approaches preferable to cost-benefit
approaches. In the following section, we address the instrumental con-
cerns involved in determining the relative effectiveness of Sunstein's pro-
posed reforms and technology-based approaches.
Economists defend the use of cost-benefit standards in formulating
social policy on risk reduction by arguing that, in some cases, it is less
expensive for society when employers pay compensation for illnesses
highly unreliable because of dependence on industry and discrepancies between TLV decisions and
literature cited by TLV committees).
58. We have elsewhere suggested several ways in which OSHA's standard-setting burdens can
be reduced. See Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative
Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 47-49 (1989). Mendeloff himself concludes that the fundamental
cause of delay in OSHA standard-setting is the fact that OSHA bears the burden of demonstrating
the necessity of any change in the status quo. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 137-38. This
strongly suggests that the solution to the problem of underregulation lies in finding ways to relieve
OSHA of this burden. Mendeloff argues that "[tihe fundamental reform that would clear the way
for a faster pace of standard setting is a lower standard of proof, construed broadly tq include the
reviews of all the influential outsiders, not just the courts." Id. at 138. However, Mendeloff is
unwilling to reduce OSHA's burden unless the standards pass the cost-benefit test he advocates. "It
would be a mistake to lower the burden of proof in the regulatory standard-setting process without
also establishing some mechanism to encourage balancing." Id. at 240.
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rather than spending money to prevent them. This argument, however,
ignores the ethical distinction between preventing death and compensat-
ing the victim's family after death occurs. As the Supreme Court's Cot-
ton Dust59 reading of the OSHA Act's legislative history indicates,
Congress apparently had this in mind when it rejected cost-benefit analy-
sis for OSHA health standards. 6° In addition, placing the entire burden
of less stringent cost-benefit-based standards on workers is inequitable.
Even if milder standards would ultimately make more resources available
to society, there is no reason why workers should not be fully compen-
sated for the losses they sustain that could have been prevented under
more stringent standards. In other words, the resources saved by a
switch to less stringent standards should go to the injured workers,
rather than to the employers or their customers. Yet few economists
advocate redistributing the efficiency gains of cost-benefit approaches to
workers. 61
Indeed, economic analysts respond that the distributional conse-
quences of their prescriptions are beyond their bailiwick. For example,
Mendeloff recognizes that the winners of a policy prescription do not
necessarily have to pay the losers for their losses under his cost-benefit
approach:
Those who die because society rejects inefficient lifesaving programs
will not be around to benefit from the bigger pie. Does this fact require
condemnation of any policy that stops short of a maximum effort to
prevent deaths? No. It is inevitable that public policy will create
losers who are beyond the reach of compensation. But this fact should
spur thinking about who the losers are and how we feel about their
plight.62
Surviving family members of workers whose deaths could have been pre-
vented at a cost somewhat greater than the economist's optimal expendi-
ture will take no comfort in the assurance that the loss of their loved one
will stimulate scholars to think more about how society should feel about
their plight.
59. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
60. Id. at 519-20.
61. Some economists do agree that the saved resources should go to the workers, but they argue
that workers are already compensated for unprevented illnesses ex ante through wage premiums or
expost through workers compensation. See W. Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH
AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 37-58, 84 (1983). If, however, workers are not compensated for
risk, these economists argue that they should be. See id. at 60. But many workers (or their families)
are not adequately compensated for unprevented illnesses. See Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 35,
at 1244-50; infra note 116 and accompanying text. Moreover, reforms that guarantee full compensa-
tion are extremely unlikely. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
62. J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 33.
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When the distributional consequences of a cost-benefit regulatory
world are considered, it becomes obvious that cost-benefit approaches
undercompensate workers in two ways. First, cost-benefit analysts un-
derestimate the value of a life. 63 Second, compensation systems pay
workers less than the full value of their lives, as defined by economists. 64
Indeed, some workers are not compensated at all. Although public pol-
icy may inevitably create some losers beyond the reach of compensation,
the cost-benefit approach creates too many uncompensated losers when
compared with technology-based approaches.
In a world where workers are seldom fully compensated for occupa-
tional illness, the merit of a technology-based approach is that it reduces
the need for victims to resort to the compensation system to a much
larger degree than does the cost-benefit approach. Under the cost-benefit
approach, significant financial burdens fall on those who are least able to
sustain them, i.e., workers and their families. In comparison, the addi-
tional costs imposed by technology-based standards are passed on to con-
sumers or absorbed by stockholders. The individual impact of these
costs on any one consumer or stockholder is insignificant compared to
the burden imposed on uncompensated or undercompensated workers
and their families, who are forced to absorb the entire cost of their ill-
nesses. Protecting workers with technology-based standards may be
more costly to society than compensating them after-the-fact. But in the
absence of a realistic mechanism to ensure adequate compensation, fair-
ness demands that workers be protected from incurring the costs of ill-
ness where possible.65
Mendeloff and other economic critics have difficulty believing that
Congress really rejected the use of cost-benefit analysis.6 6 Because no
rational consumer would pay $25 in a private market for something that
is worth only $20, the economist assumes that voters also intend for their
representatives to reject policies whose costs exceed their "economic"
benefits.
However, the economist fails to understand that public, social deci-
sions provide citizens with an opportunity to give certain things a higher
valuation than they would otherwise choose to give them in their private
activities or in their capacity as individuals. In public forums, individu-
63. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
64. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
65. Sunstein objects to using regulation for redistributional purposes on the instrumental
grounds that this method is inefficient and calls for increased use of workers compensation. See
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 640. If cost-benefit approaches fully compensated workers for their inju-
res, these objections would no longer be valid. But, as discussed later, it is unlikely that this will
happen even under Sunstein's proposed reforms. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
66. See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 9, at 15.
Vol. 1991:729]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL[
als are often willing to vote for outcomes that economic analysis would
characterize as inefficient because these outcomes can confirm and serve
important noneconomic values.67 As consumers, we may dislike paying
more for manufactured products because of the costs of protecting work-
ers, but as citizens we can rationally vote for these types of costly and (by
the economist's "willingness to pay" measure) irrational goals. We vote
in favor of such costly goals because they permit us to reaffirm our ideal
that preventable occupational diseases are not merely inefficient-they
are wrong.68
Sunstein's analysis on this point is distressingly ambiguous. On one
hand, Sunstein acknowledges the normative legitimacy of using the polit-
ical system to implement values that do not receive adequate recognition
in markets,69 and he eloquently opines that "[s]ometimes the strongest
arguments for regulation sound in democracy rather than efficiency."'70
In particular, Sunstein cites the protection of the environment and of
endangered species as important examples of the implementation of dem-
ocratic aspirations, or noncommodity values, that the marketplace un-
dervalues.71 Yet in virtually the same breath, Sunstein recommends that
policy-makers, as well as courts, hew to a proportionality principle in
setting regulatory goals, 72 and "adopt a strong presumption in favor of
flexible, market-oriented, incentive-based regulatory strategies" at the
implementation stage.73
One is tempted to conclude that Professor Sunstein wants it both
ways-a market-oriented world in which noncommodity values hold
sway. However, leveling charges of hypocrisy at Professor Sunstein may
be unfair. He may merely be trying to find some middle ground to which
both ends of the political spectrum can gravitate. Sunstein may be argu-
ing that although it is appropriate for Congress to require strict regula-
tion on behalf of noncommodity values, policymakers and the courts
67. See Frank, A Theory of Moral Sentiments, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 71-72 (J. Man-
sbridge ed. 1990).
68. In other words, "[t]he goals that we set as voters constantly remind us as we assume our
role as consumers that there are things in life more important than the pursuit of material wealth."
McGarity, Media-Quality, supra note 17, at 194-95.
69. See C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 57-58 (1990).
70. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 620. The most persuasive proponent of this viewpoint is Profes-
sor Sagoff, whose numerous works Sunstein fails to mention. See, eg., M. SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY
OF THE EARTH (1988).
71. See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 69, at 183.
72. See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 69, at 182 (discussing with approval National Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986), which concluded that a section of the
Clean Air Act was subject to a cost-benefit standard although Congress had made no reference to
one).
73. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 633.
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shbuld not assume that it has done so unless Congress has clearly an-
n6unced such an intention. Convinced that "strict government controls
... produce underregulation as well as overregulation,"' 74 Sunstein may
conclude that a presumption in favor of market values will best serve the
interests of workers and environmentalists. If so, the labor and environ-
mental groups that Sunstein seeks to help remain singularly uncon-
vinced. These groups have consistently opposed cost-benefit balancing
as a test for setting regulatory goals,75 and, with a few exceptions, they
have resisted incentive-based implementation techniques.76
Alternatively, Sunstein may be saying than he favors strict regula-
tion, but not to the point where we spend huge amounts of money to
obtain speculative benefits. Thus, although Sunstein may not require
costs and benefits to be exactly equated, he might oppose strict regulation
if the ratio of costs to benefits gets too far out of line. In this case, Sun-
stein's argument merely sounds a sensible cautionary note that in the
context of regulation, pushing too hard may be counterproductive. 77
If Sunstein in fact finds himself closer to this latter position, we
would urge him to reconsider his opposition to the technology-based ap-
proach. Technology-based regulation is concededly imperfect. It spawns
messy legislative and judicial struggles, is subject to industry and agency
manipulation, and often appears irrational when measured by compre-
hensive analytical rationality standards.7" But this "academic failure"
has been an enormous success in the real world.79
In addition to the proven effectiveness of the technology-based ap-
proaches, technological requirements reflect a considered normative
choice about the proper balance between lives and monetary costs. Ac-
knowledging that society cannot vest workers with an unqualified right
74. Id. at 630.
75. See, e.g., Claybrook & Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of Regulation: Disclosing the Auto
Safety Payoff, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 87, 125-131 (1985) (describing the opposition to cost-benefit anal-
ysis by the president of Public Citizen). See generally S. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMA-
NENcE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITIcs IN THE UNITED STATES 1955-1985, at 391 (1987)
(environmental advocacy of general public divorced from use of economics as a policy tool).
76. See, eg., Breger, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, Providing, Economic Incentives in Environ-
mentalRegulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463,481-82 (1991) (remarks of David Hawkins, a member of
the Natural Resources Defense Council).
77. Although we find this interpretation of Sunstein's position very attractive, it raises the
troubling question of how much expense on risk reduction technology is "too much." We have no
bright-line answer to this question. The familiar notion of the "knee-of-the-curve" (the point on the
cost curve where costs begin to escalate dramatically) may provide an attractive starting point.
However, we suspect that uncertainties in the data often hide that elusive cost-curve crook. See
McGarity, Media-Quality, supra note 17, at 183.
78. See T. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS
IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 211-20 (1991).
79. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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to an absolutely safe workplace, one may rationally assert that workers
do have a right to insist that employers "do the best they can" to protect
human health. In other words, society might justifiably decide to reduce
risky behavior beyond the point indicated by a cost-benefit test. Indeed,
society may choose to limit its protection of workers only at the point
where the protection would cause industry substantial economic disloca-
tion. 0 This point seems to elude Sunstein altogether.81 Moreover, Sun-
stein's own approach lacks any moral compass for determining what
level of risk is appropriate in hard cases. Although Sunstein is prepared
to abandon BAT for the use of financial incentives, he seems uncomforta-
ble with Mendeloff's advocacy of a strict quantitative cost-benefit test for
the validity of regulations.8 2 In rejecting systems that solely rely on mar-
ket tests, Sunstein abandons efficiency as the primary goal for regulation.
Yet Sunstein does not offer any overriding substitute goal for regulation,
because he also discards the BAT approach, which unabashedly makes
worker protection its primary goal.8 3 Instead, Sunstein proposes a sensi-
ble-sounding, but ultimately unsatisfying, "lite" version of cost-benefit
analysis that offers no better guidance for making difficult line-drawing
judgments than the technology-based approach.
IV. THE INSTRUMENTAL BASIS FOR TECHNOLOGY-BASED
REGULATION
In addition to advocating a "lite" cost-benefit test for regulatory
goals, Sunstein believes that market-oriented implementation techniques
will more appropriately achieve regulatory goals.84 Sunstein would erect
a presumption in favor of market-based regulatory options, such as emis-
sions trading and pollution taxes.8 5 These strategies, according to Sun-
stein, "will increase efficiency, promote [regulation's] own purposes,
and-by focusing public attention on the right questions-further demo-
cratic goals as well."'86 Sunstein further claims that a switch from a
80. See Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens: If Feasibility Analysis is the
Answer, What is the Question?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1504 (1990). Although a BAT mandate
could require employers to spend more money to protect workers than a cost-benefit mandate, in
most cases BAT strategies do not threaten to put a substantial number of companies in economic
jeopardy. Because BAT standards only require the adoption of technologies already in place in some
firms in the industry, most industry members will be in a position to comply with the standards at a
reasonable cost.
81. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 629 (choice of BAT level is "largely incidental" to the deter-
mination of the appropriate level of pollution).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 629-30.
84. See id. at 631-34.
85. See id. at 634-39.
86. Id. at 633.
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"command-and-control" technology-based approach to an incentive-
based regime would solve many of the problems of OSHA's current regu-
latory program.8 7 Although we agree that a judicious use of market-
oriented implementation techniques might well improve the current sys-
tem, we believe that Professor Sunstein's enthusiasm is misplaced. More
importantly, in his attacks on the technology-based approach to regula-
tion, Sunstein often mixes normative arguments about regulatory goals
with instrumental arguments about reaching those goals. For example,
Sunstein does not clearly recognize that incentive-based tools may be
used to reach the normative goal of installing the best available technol-
ogy.s8 Instead, Sunstein appears to view BAT and market-based ap-
proaches as mutually exclusive. In the process, Sunstein overstates both
the ease of implementing his approach and the difficulty of implementing
technology-based commands.
Specifically, in discussing market-based incentives, Sunstein asserts
that "[i]f the ultimate goal is to reduce pollution sharply, then we should
simply issue few permits."8' 9 He also assumes that risks from toxic sub-
stances could easily be reduced by simply assessing high taxes on, for
examples, toxic waste disposal and automobile emissions.90 These opti-
mistic assessments may underestimate the difficulties inherent in estimat-
ing risks and benefits. In addition, the incentive-based approach adds
new uncertainties to the prediction of the number of permits and level of
taxes necessary to achieve a given level of risk reduction, on top of the
already existing uncertainties about how various levels of exposure to
toxic substances affect humans and the environment. Unless agencies are
prepared to tolerate potentially high exposures and/or devastating short-
term economic consequences during the time it takes for the system to
reach "steady state," proceedings examining the level of tax or the issua-
ble number of- permits are likely to be highly contentious. Moreover,
because industry will likely resist any change to the status quo, especially
if it requires immediate outlays,91 implementation of any market-based
program is likely to be slow.
Sunstein cites the history of environmental legislation in support of
his conclusion that an incentive-based approach could be implemented
87. See id. at 640-41.
88. Indeed, the very first legislative proposal for a pollution tax in Congress (Senator
Proxmire's sulfur dioxide tax of 1972) was aimed at providing sufficient economic incentives to in-
duce power plants to install scrubbers. See J. BONINE & T. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 653-55 (1984).
89. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 636.
90. See id. at 637-39.
91. See Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1968, at 227, 236.
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more easily than could the BAT approaches. 92 In particular, he com-
pares the productive results under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 93 and the
Clean Water Act (CWA)94 with the government's less effective attempts
to regulate toxic substances.95 Ironically, the CAA and CWA both
adopted technology-based approaches to a large extent.96 Moreoyer,
when Congress recognized that the overwhelming uncertainties and ana-
lytical quagmires concerning risk assessment were bogging down the
toxic substance programs, Congress first amended both statutes specifi-
cally to allow the EPA to implement technology-based approaches. 97
Later, Congress moved to establish more stringent standards in cases
where BAT failed to adequately protect the public health.98 Thus, Con-
gress recognized, as Sunstein does not, that "the practical consequence of
92. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 627-28.
93. Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
94. Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
95. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 625.
96. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)), required direct industrial dischargers of con-
ventional pollutants to install the "best practicable control technology" by 1977 and the "best avail-
able technology" by 1983. Id. § 301(b), 86 Stat. at 845 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1988)). The
deadlines were extended in 1977, and the "best available technology" requirement was changed to
"best conventional technology" for normal water pollutants. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-217, § 42, 91 Stat. 1566, 1582-83. The first round of controls resulted in some impressive
reductions in conventional pollutant discharges. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EX-
ECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS 31 (1989) (table showing effluent
reductions associated with pulp and paper mills from 1973 to 1984). The results of the second round
of controls are more debatable, partially because its deadlines were extended in 1987, see Water
Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 301, 101 Stat. 7, 29, and partially because of the agency's
lack of enthusiasm for environmental goals during the critical implementation period of the early
1980s. See, eg., Sen. Durenburger Pushes EPA to Set National Standards for Drinking Water, Daily
Rep. Execs. (BNA) No. 56, at A-17 (Mar. 22, 1985); Toxic Waste Cleanup Sputters, Eng'g News-
Record, Nov. 19, 1981, at 10.
The Clean Air Act adopted a technology-based approach for new sources of pollution. See 42
U.S.C. § 7411 (1988). The principal program aimed at requiring states to implement plans to meet
the media-quality-based ambient air quality standards identified in the Act for new and existing
sources by the statutory deadlines. See id. § 7410. Although states could adopt any credible imple-
mentation plan to meet the federal standards (including marketable permits and effluent fees) most
states simply adopted technology-based regimes requiring major sources of pollution to install the
best available technology. Perhaps incentive-based approaches would have achieved the same results
more cheaply and quickly, but state environmental officials evidently thought otherwise.
97. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(a)(2), 91 Stat. 1566, 1589.
98. EPA's first attempt to regulate toxic water pollutants under section 307 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 became bogged down in a bout of seemingly
interminable generic rulemaking. See Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments ofi972, 63 IOWA L. REV. 609 (1978) (recounting origins of the
consent decree that resulted from the bogged-down section 307 regulations). When the EPA's at-
tempts to set standards for toxins under § 112 of the Clean Air Act suffered a similar fate, Congress
once again amended the Act, this time requiring that the EPA mandate "maximum available control
technology" for listed pollutants by statutory deadlines. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§ 301, 104 Stat. 2531.
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making particularized risk estimates legally relevant.., is to emasculate
the regulation of carcinogens under prevailing conditions of scientific
certainty." 99
The recent amendments to the CAA that permit states to use emis-
sions trading and pollution taxes do not refute this point. Congress has
already established the permissible levels of exposure for conventional
pollutants in the CAA itself.10° Thus, financial incentives do not affect
the decision of what ambient air quality standards are appropriate. Con-
sequently, we do not oppose the added flexibility that the 1990 amend-
ments give states to reach the predetermined goals. 10 1
However, Congress has been slow to apply this lesson across the
board. In fact, one of the reasons that OSHA has regulated so few toxic
substances is that it is required to make individual risk assessments for
each substance regulated. In the Benzene case, the Supreme Court read
the risk assessment requirement into OSHA's legislative mandate 0 2
although even Sunstein agrees that little in the text or history of the Act
supports this interpretation.10 3 We have elsewhere proposed that Con-
gress should give OSHA a choice between adopting less stringent BAT
regulations and more stringent regulations based on individual risk deter-
minations.104 We are confident that this relatively modest change would
speed up the decisionmaking process, just as the changes to the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act did.
In addition to providing a speedier approach to regulation, BAT
strategies, when compared to market-based approaches, stack up well on
other instrumental grounds. A comparison of Sunstein's four indict-
ments of BAT with the probable implementation difficulties of a market-
based approach indicates that BAT is not nearly as oafish as Sunstein
suggests, and that market-based approaches are not nearly as neat.
In both cases, the installation of the required control technology may not be sufficient to protect
public health to the desired degree. If so, further efforts, perhaps through some type of economic
incentives, may be necessary. But a technology-based approach was necessary to get the programs
off the ground.
99. Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and
"Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1329 (1985).
100. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 101(b)-(d), 102(h),
107(c), 108(d), 412, 104 Stat. 2404, 2422, 2464, 2466, 2634.
101. However, we would caution that attempts to use economic incentives to regulate exposure
to hundreds of toxic air pollutants in the absence of predetermined "acceptable" exposure limits
would probably fail.
102. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-40
(1980) (the Benzene case) (plurality opinion).
103. See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 69, at 194.
104. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 58, at 45-50.
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First, Sunstein argues that because BAT strategies ignore the enor-
mous differences among plants in industries and among geographical ar-
eas, these strategies are "wildly inefficient."105 According to Sunstein,
emissions trading programs perform more efficiently because they allow
firms with high abatement costs to buy additional permits to pollute from
firms with low abatement costs. 10 6 However, BAT systems do not oper-
ate in the blind manner that Sunstein indicates. No agency ignores the
types of geographical and intra-industry differences Sunstein cites.
Rather, agencies utilize a system of variances to account for these differ-
ences. 107 Emissions trading may be less expensive to administer than the
relatively cumbersome system of variances, and the variance process can
be abused to allow unjustified departures from the national standards. 0 8
However, characterizing the BAT approach as "wildly" inefficient is an
inaccurate overstatement of BAT's performance in practice.
Moreover, Sunstein fails to discuss the administrative costs associ-
ated with the reforms that he proposes. For example, because we do not
know exactly how much abatement a pollution or injury tax would
cause, the tax would likely have to be adjusted several times to meet the
abatement goals. Aside from the problem of whether Congress (or any
legislature) would be willing to alter the tax after it has been initially set,
the costs associated with these changes must be factored into any com-
parison of BAT and market-related incentives.
Second, Sunstein argues that BAT strategies are "extremely expen-
sive to enforce, imposing extraordinary monitoring burdens" on EPA
105. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 628.
106. See id. at 634.
107. See Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HAV. ENVTL. L.
REv. 1 (1985). From the very beginning, EPA has allowed any individual source that is subject to a
"categorical" technology-based standard promulgated pursuant to section 301 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988), to demonstrate to the permitting official that it is entitled to a "funda-
mentally different factors" variance. The variance is available if the source demonstrates that factors
relating to its waste stream are fundamentally different from the factors considered by EPA in estab-
lishing the standard. See Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (fundamentally different factors variance available against standards for
toxic substances); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1976) (suggesting that a
fundamentally different factors variance is required in the case of "best practicable technology" stan-
dards for conventional pollutants, but holding that such a variance is not required for new source
performance standards).
108. Sources can attempt to obtain fundamentally different factors variances based on factors
unrelated to the statutory criteria for defining categories of sources. For example, for a time sources
sought fundamentally different factors variances on the ground that they were fundamentaly differ-
ent in that they could not afford to install the required technologies. EPA's opposition to this at-
tempt to abuse the variance process was upheld in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S.
64 (1980). See also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[I]t is clear
that the mere existence of 'different' factors at a particular site do not give rise to the 'fundamentally
different factors' necessary to justify a variance.").
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and OSHA.10 9 But this is not reality. BAT strategies are less expensive
to enforce because inspectors are only required to determine whether a
firm has installed the required technology and continues to operate it
properly. By comparison, emissions trading and pollution taxes require
inspectors to monitor constantly the amount of pollution that a plant
emits. In many cases, monitoring all the possible discharge points for air
and water pollution will be far more expensive and difficult than identify-
ing whether a firm is using a required technology.' 10 In the air pollution
context, the incentive-based approach would create an incentive to abuse
the system by hiding emissions in all but the very simplest plants.
Third, Sunstein contends that because BAT strategies impose
stricter regulatory requirements on new plants and industries than old
ones, they penalize new products and thereby perpetuate old, dirty tech-
nology."' In contrast, pollution taxes and marketable permits would,
according to Sunstein, induce firms to invest in new technologies.1 12 To
the extent the system is adequately policed to ensure that firms do not
avoid paying the taxes in the first place, or cheat by emitting in excess of
their permits, we agree with this assessment. However, the current in-
come tax system, with its monument to the ingenuity of tax avoidance,
does not inspire optimism on this point.
Finally, Sunstein objects to using regulation to pursue redistributive
objectives, because it is less efficient in obtaining these objectives than
more direct redistribution techniques.1 1 3 Thus, if society prefers to shift
the costs of occupational disease from workers to their employers, Sun-
stein would advocate revamping workers compensation rather than using
BAT strategies to accomplish this goal.11 4 Although we have already
expressed normative objections to choosing compensation over preven-
tion, we also believe that compensation is unlikely to be increased to the
point where it fully compensates workers for their injuries and illnesses.
First, fifty states must act to reform workers compensation; this fact
alone makes significant reform unlikely. In addition, experience indi-
109. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 628.
110. See McGarity, Media-Quality, supra note 17, at 210.
111. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 628. Sunstein also claims that BAT strategies target symp-
toms, rather than the underlying causes of pollution. Id. For example, Sunstein claims that the use
of financial incentives to address the problem of acid rain, rather than the current "scrubbing tech-
nologies" requirements, will encourage American consumers and industry to shift from coal to
cleaner, renewable fuels. See id. This argument, however, is just a variation of the argument that
market-incentives are more likely to induce interest in new technologies or solutions to current
problems.
112. See id. at 634-39.
113. See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 69, at 55-57.
114. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 640.
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cates that states are unlikely to increase benefits any time soon. 115 In the
face of employer threats to relocate to states less inclined to redistribute
wealth from employers to employees, most states will be unwilling to
become the first to reform their workers compensation laws. Congress
could possibly overcome these difficulties by federalizing workers com-
pensation, but it is unlikely to take such a drastic step in the near future
because of political considerations. Congress might more feasibly enact
an injury tax and make the proceeds available to the states to augment
workers compensation funding for both injuries and diseases. Although
this could be a positive step drawing on the incentive-based approach and
accomplishing redistributive goals, it would not address the more press-
ing problem of uncompensated workplace diseases.
Yet even this step is unlikely to provide full compensation for work-
ers for injuries and illnesses. Workers compensation systems have been
designed to keep an employee from starving, rather than to compensate
the worker for medical expenses and lost wages.1 16 Thus, if Sunstein in-
tends to ensure that workers compensation, an injury tax, or some com-
bination of the two forces employers to bear the full costs of the injuries
and illnesses they cause, he should forthrightly press for the revolution-
ary recasting of current workers compensation regimes that this would
require.
Even with its problems, technology-based regulation compares fa-
vorably with market-related incentives from a strictly instrumental per-
spective. We therefore consider a more incremental path to occupational
safety and health reform more likely. Congress might be persuaded to
authorize OSHA to use BAT, while at the same time allow OSHA to
115. Although benefits levels have gradually improved in the last two decades, employers in
most states have the political power to slow or stop most legislative reform efforts. See Schroeder &
Shapiro, supra note 35, at 1250 ("Opponents of reform represent an impressive political force. Typi-
cally, the insurance industry, workers compensation lawyers, and employers have combined to op-
pose reform efforts."). One expert points out that the increased cost of workers compensation
insurance that accompanies increased benefits "make[s] further improvements in state laws more
difficult and [has] generated pressures in several jurisdictions to reduce costs, often by cutting back
benefits." Burton, Introduction, in NEw PERSPECTIVES IN WORKERS COMPENSATION 4 (J. Burton
ed. 1988). He predicts that "in a number of states, there will be a continuing struggle to achieve or
maintain adequate benefits, with the likely outcome that, in a significant minority, benefits will re-
main below the adequacy standards prescribed by the national commission." Id.
116. States have executed this policy by capping the amount of compensation an employer is
required to pay at levels often far below employees' salaries. For example, 42 states have a compen-
sation cap of $450 per week or less for employees who are temporarily unable to work. U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, STATE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAWS Table 6 (1990). Almost identical caps exist for permanent disabilities. Id.
Table 7. Moreover, some states do not even meet the goal of keeping employees from starving. In
eight states, the maximum compensation amount for temporarily disabled workers is below the pov-
erty level for a family of four. In another nine states, compensation is within $50 of the poverty
level. Id. Table 6.
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regulate more stringently if necessary to reduce or eliminate significant
workplace risks. Unlike drastic workers compensation reform, this step
would protect workers before they are injured, and reduce the number of
illnesses for which employees would never be fully compensated because
of difficulties in establishing cause-effect relationships between workplace
exposures and individual diseases.
V. CONCLUSION
Sunstein's solution to the paradox he perceives-that "overregula-
tion causes underregulation"-is to circumscribe toxic substance regula-
tion by subjecting its regulatory goals to at least a weak form of cost-
benefit analysis. In addition, Sunstein advocates the use of measures like
pollution taxes to deliver more effective regulation. Although we agree
that toxic substances are currently underregulated, our solution is pre-
cisely that which Sunstein condemns-a BAT approach to OSHA regu-
lation as an initial step followed by more stringent regulation where
necessary that could perhaps rely upon economic incentives. Unlike
Sunstein, we find no paradoxes in this approach. The evidence of over-
regulation marshalled by Mendeloff does not support his conclusions that
OSHA's regulations entail costs that exceed benefits by millions of dol-
lars or that stringent regulation causes underregulation. Industry will
oppose both weak and strong regulations with equal vigor as long as it is
in its financial interest to do so. Therefore, we believe that the solution to
industry opposition is to make it easier for OSHA to regulate, rather
than yielding to industry opposition by abandoning the goals of occupa-
tional safety and health regulation.
Our preference for the BAT approach is primarily normative. We
would prefer to prevent injuries to the extent feasible, instead of compen-
sating for them after they occur. Unlike Sunstein, we recognize that
workers do not currently receive adequate compensation for their inju-
ries, and we believe Sunstein's reforms are unlikely to do anything to
remedy this problem. We also believe that one can make a moral case for
the proposition that society should do the best it can to protect workers,
even when the resources devoted to that enterprise exceed the benefits
predicted by the "willingness to pay" measure of value. Although Sun-
stein elegantly defends society's prerogative to use regulation to imple-
ment aspirations such as ours, he seems hesitant to apply these precepts
on behalf of workers.
We do not mean to reject Sunstein's proposals out of hand. As an
adjunct to technology-based regulation, Sunstein's proposals-including
increased workers compensation and injury taxes-could induce addi-
tional abatement of toxic substances and result in additional compensa-
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tion of workers. As a substitute for BAT, however, incentive approaches
lead to even less regulation and compensation than current levels because
they will become entangled in case-by-case determinations of "accepta-
ble" levels of risk. Economists have succeeded in exposing the maladies
of the technology-based approach for all to see, and from a distance their
alternative approach looks better by comparison. But, as we have
demonstrated, the incentive approach also has a considerable number of
problems. Before we abandon BAT for Sunstein's proposals, we advise a
closer look at both.
